Last Wednesday’s
Kowalski affair revealed once again that as the Detroit Lions head
into another off-season, one question mark towers above all others.
In fact, it was probably the most prominent question heading into last
off-season as well: is Joey Harrington the real deal?
Both logic and anxiety
lace this question. Logic because no position affects a team’s success like the
quarterback and anxiety because Lions’ fans know that mediocrity behind center
tends to translate into losing records. So it is no surprise that the
Harrington Debate has taken on a life of its own. For three years now, and in
various forms, it has raged since the Lions first drafted him third over all in
the 2002 amateur draft. Does Harrington have greater upside, or his back up
McMahon? How does Harrington compare to the quarterback drafted ahead of him,
David Carr? Does Harrington’s development match that of Favre in terms of his
mastery of the West Coast Offense?
During the last three
years in Detroit, no other athlete has received more scrutiny than Joey
Harrington. No other question continues to spark as much passion from Lions’
fans then Harrington’s prowess or lack of it. In fact, fans throughout Lions’
country appear so divided on this question that they found it necessarily to
invent a new set of identities to label themselves. Joey lover, west coast fan,
and Harrington basher are some of the monikers that are applied in a now quite
mature game of defining and belittling the other.
With Harrington having
been explored from so many angles, without pause, and with people’s opinions
having become so cemented, what use is there in raising it once again? Are we
beating a dead horse? What else can we say? Hasn’t every angle been explored,
dissected, and rehashed again, from Harrington’s mobility to his body language,
even his beverage choices?
Perhaps, but
there is an odd paradox that rules hot button issues such the Harrington
Debate. Sometimes the closer we look at or into something the less we know.
This is because the sheer amount of material overwhelms our perspective so that
we cannot see the forest for the trees. The vitriol injected into the
Harrington debate and the passion with which people line up “for” or “against”
him has served as an additional distraction. It tends to polarize Lions’ fans
and to obscure the potential common ground between their positions.
This being the case, when
Tom Kowalski’s January 12 article sensationalized minutiae- the Lions were
reviewing Harrington’s performance and contract as part of their off season
review- a maelstrom erupted. Fans started to hit the talk show phone lines and
internet bulletin boards. Was Joey headed out of town, many wondered? Had the
Lions lost faith in him? Were the coaches at odds with the front office on this
issue?
The Lions’ official and
carefully phrased denial extinguished the wildest fires that had raged through
the talk show circuit. For better or worse we can expect Harrington to line up
under center when the Lions open their season. But the press release also fell
short of a total endorsement for Harrington. In that way it aggravated rather
than resolved the question. Fans were left wondering whether Harrington
deserved to be given another opportunity. Were the Lions actively looking for a
replacement? What did the front office believe about the likelihood that
Harrington will improve next year?
The Harrington question is
important and comes with a ten million dollar price tag. Harrington’s past
numbers are anything but conclusive when it comes to projecting his future in
the NFL. As Mariucci took pains to point out, Harrington closed out his most
productive season in 2004. Measured in terms of the NFL’s popular short hand
for efficiency, the quarterback rating, Harrington did make a substantial 13.6
jump up to 77.5 this year. Alas that only ranked him 22nd among NFL
quarterbacks. Worse, his statistical improvement only gave the Lions one extra
lousy victory after they added considerable offensive talent to help Harrington
succeed.
When the evidence is
inconclusive, the answer to the Harrington question depends more on what you
look at, or more often, even how you feel about him, rather than on where or how
closely you chose to look at his statistics. In Lions’ country pessimists and
optimists, Joey lovers and Harrington bashers simply approach the question from
too many different angles to reconcile their findings. A few also take joy in
trouncing their opponents, which tends to obscure the potential middle ground.
Another contributing
factor is that “development” is an imprecise concept that lends itself to
various interpretations. If you measure development in terms of team victories,
the QB composite rating, or even something more ephemeral like “leadership” you
will get widely different results.
A final factor is the
intrinsic complexity of the West Coast Offense system that Joey has played in
during his entire NFL career. With multiple routes and even more route options,
both the quarterback and receivers need to be on the same page for a play to
have a chance at success. The system relies upon timing, reading, and ball
placement to an unparalleled degree, conditions that increase both the potential
for success and the margin for failure. When you master the West Coast Offense
you should have an advantage in that your scheme gives you the flexibility to
exploit match ups. At the same time, the window of opportunity on any given
play is so small that little miscues steam roll. A throw that arrives 1/10 of
second to late or 2 inches to wide more than often results in an incomplete pass
if not an interception.
According to conventional
wisdom the third year is the key in a quarterback’s development within the West
Coast Offense. This rule of thumb has become so ingrained in popular thinking
that sometimes the first three years are designated an “apprenticeship” and
mastery of it is believed to follow a “learning curve”. Only after three off
seasons of film study and intensive coaching, along with all the essential game
experience can you feel “comfortable” in this complex offensive system. Taken
to extremes this mode of reasoning would argue that Harrington has only just
finished his apprenticeship and one could only expect his numbers to stink as a
result.
This article proposes to
tackle Harrington Debate to the next level by taking a systematic and in depth
look at statistics. As Harry Truman once noted, however, “there are lies,
damned lies, and statistics.” What Truman was getting at is how statistics can
be manipulated to validate a writer’s prejudices or interest. We should not be
surprised then that statistics can render a dramatically different picture of
Harrington’s progress.
This is a joint study
undertaken by Tom Boogaart and Mike Marino. We attempt to break down
comprehensively all available statistics in an attempt to resolve the Harrington
debate. Our approach is both amateurish from a social science point of view,
and sophisticated from the perspective of typical sports journalism. Although
we invent no complex statistical equations or new composite ratings, we will
study a pivotal question that sports journalists do not often tackle in great
depth. There are seven questions that we are interested in exploring:
1.) Is Harrington
progressing?
2.) In what particular
areas has Harrington progressed?
3.) How does Harrington’s
development relate to other quarterbacks?
4.) How does he perform in
crucial situations or adverse conditions?
5.) How has Harrington’s
performance been impacted by his surround cast?
6.) Is there a pattern to
quarterback development in the NFL?
7.) How does Harrington’s
development compare to that of other WCO quarterbacks?
II. The Season’s End
Perspective
When you compare
Harrington’s performance season by season it indicates steady and incremental
progress over the course of his career, which is certainly a promising sign for
the future.
Table I. Harrington’s NFL
Career
|
Season |
Comp% |
Yards |
YPA |
TD /INT |
QB Rating |
|
2002 |
50.1% |
2294 |
5.35 |
12/16 |
59.9 |
|
2003 |
55.8% |
2880 |
5.20 |
17/22 |
63.9 |
|
2004 |
56% |
3047 |
6.23 |
19/12 |
77.7 |
There are several
distortions, however, that muddle such a comparison. Perhaps the biggest
distortion derives from the fact that Harrington’s surrounding cast has changed
significantly since his inaugural season. In his first season, Schroeder,
Hakim, Ricks, and Stewart lined up with him. Most would acknowledge that this
was a respectable, but not a strong supporting cast. None of those players
started in the Pro Bowl and most of those players are already out of the
league. By 2004, the Lions fielded a talent set that included Rogers, Williams,
Jones, and Alexander. That is a very talented group that includes one former
Pro Bowler, and three players with Hall of Fame potential. By improving
Harrington’s cast his numbers should have made a great leap forward, except for
a hitch. The Lions suffered a devastating and recurrent set of injuries to
their receiver corps. In fact, during Harrington entire three year career there
has not been only player that he has spent more than two training camps. The
chemistry that is such an integral ingredient in great offenses success has been
missing during Harrington’s career. From a statistical comparison point of
view, however, that is good news because it suggests that Harrington’s progress
can be largely attributed to his own efforts rather than that of his surrounding
cast. From that perspective, Harrington’s 13.8 jump is significant and one
wonders how that compares to other quarterbacks between their second and third
seasons. However, as skeptics are already noting, we must also take into
account that much of Harrington’s improvement comes as a result of ineptitude
earlier in his career. At 77.9, Harrington’s quarterback rating ranks no better
than 22nd among NFL regulars! If one also factors in a league wide
inflation in passing numbers, Harrington’s jump in productivity is significant
only if it signals a continuing trend line.
III. The 2004 Season from
the Perspective of the Calendar
Everyone remembers the two
trajectories that defined the Lions’ 2004 season. The Lions’ teased us by
opening the season 4-2. Then they collapsed, winning only two of their next ten
games. For those who matched those games it should comes as no surprise that
Harrington’s numbers generally mirrored the team’s tail spin.
Table II. Harrington’s
2004 Season Broken Down by Months
|
Month/Team |
Comp% |
Yards |
YPA |
TD/INT |
QB Rating |
|
Sept (2-1) |
59.6% |
562 |
6.31 |
6/2 |
91.1 |
|
Oct (1-3) |
64.4% |
732 |
7.25 |
6/2 |
97.5 |
|
Nov (1-3) |
49.6% |
637 |
5.02 |
2/3 |
59.7 |
|
Dec (1-3) |
48.5% |
770 |
6.26 |
3/4 |
63.4 |
|
Jan (0-1) |
67.3% |
346 |
|
2/1 |
92.7 |
When you break up
Harrington’s numbers by months the results are dramatic. Harrington clearly
peaked early in the season in conjunction with the team’s hot start. Following
that his numbers plummeted. In December, Harrington lifted himself out of the
tailspin only by a whisker raising his QB rating to a paltry 63.4. He did
rebound in the January game against Tennessee, but that means little since other
quarterbacks had performed equally or better against that decimated defense.
The general downward trend
of Harrington’s numbers is neither grounds for optimism or indicative of a
better grasp of the offensive system. This trend contradicts the appearance of
progress when you compare Harrington’s year end numbers. The critical question
that fans debated during the second half slump was whether Harrington was the
cause or the victim of the team’s wider collapse? Examining how Harrington
performed in critical situations might offer a clue and partial answer to that
question.
IV. Harrington in Critical
Situations
Nothing defines the great
NFL quarterbacks more than how they perform under duress. It is not for nothing
that fans, reporters, and announcers use colorful machismo laden terms like
“gunslinger” to describe their quarterbacks. It is what players do when it
matters most that establishes their reputation with fans and their peers.
Maybe that is unfair.
Fans are more prone to remember the last second touchdown catch than the equally
crucial third quarter block by the fullback that moved the chains and kept a
drive alive, but there can be no questioning results. Good quarterbacks produce
when it matters, because this is the prime quality that makes them good. Using
NFL.com’s situational statistics I have isolated several categories that qualify
as pressure situations or critical junctures during a game.
Table III. Harrington in
Duress
|
Category |
Comp% |
Yards |
YPA |
1rst% |
TD/INT |
QB Rating |
|
2 mins before halftime |
50% |
449 |
6.24 |
63.9% |
2/2 |
67.4 |
|
4th Quarter |
56.8% |
900 |
6.82 |
60% |
9/5 |
84.8 |
|
Margin 0-7
points |
52.5% |
1734 |
5.80 |
49.7% |
8/8 |
67.8 |
|
Third Down |
51.7% |
817 |
5.56 |
60.5% |
5/4 |
68.3 |
|
Red Zone |
47.3% |
153 |
2.94 |
72.7% |
13/1 |
81.4 |
What Harrington’s numbers
show is that in high pressure situations, like the last two minutes of the half,
when the game is within a touchdown, or on third down when he most often faced
some kind of blitz, Harrington’s QB rating tracks ten points below his season
average in terms of his quarterback rating.
For Joey Bashers this is
grist for the mill, but we have to be careful about jumping to premature
conclusions. After all, the QB rating measures performance during the course of
an entire game, while these pressure situations measure performance when the
odds are often stacked against the quarterback. To provide a standard of
comparison I also compiled the numbers of a quarterback that most fans would
accept as the NFL’s most stalwart performer at the quarterback position, Brett
Favre.
Table IV. Favre in Duress
|
Category |
Comp% |
Yards |
YPA |
1rst% |
TD/INT |
QB Rating |
|
2 mins before halftime |
56.8% |
616 |
6.48 |
61.1% |
3/2 |
78.4 |
|
4th Quarter |
65% |
981 |
6.48 |
58.2% |
6/7 |
78.9 |
|
Margin 0-7
points |
65.5% |
1649 |
7.50 |
57.6% |
12/7 |
92.8 |
|
Third Down |
65% |
1171 |
8.19 |
71% |
7/4 |
95.1 |
|
Red Zone |
47.3% |
153 |
2.94 |
67.4% |
13/1 |
81.4 |
Harrington and Favre’s
numbers are actually quite comparable except for one glaring difference: there
is nearly a 10% differential between the two quarterback’s first down conversion
success during pressure situations, like third down, or when the game is within
a touchdown margin.
That may not seem like a
lot, but it is actually a substantial difference. Favre, in pressure
situations, throws the ball longer and with greater proficiency. Although 10%
may not seem like a lot, it translates to a huge margin on the field, keeping
drives alive, eating up clock, wearing down defenses, and providing your offense
more opportunities to score. I would argue that no statistic better captures
the gap between the Packers 10-6 record and the Lions 6-10 record. The big
yardage differential between the two teams’ offenses could also be explained on
this basis.
In other measures
Harrington’s numbers are quite respectable. His fourth quarter numbers and red
zone rating are slightly higher than his season averages, for instance. In
fact, Harrington’s numbers are typically higher than Favre’s in these
departments. This probably reflects a natural inflation that is the result of
the Lions playing from behind. Harrington faced more prevent defenses that
padded his statistics. Even his critics have to acknowledge that Harrington’
performance in the red zone was stellar. His quarterback rating was high
largely because he only threw one interception in this area of the field. That
suggests good management of the ball, an ability to put the ball where only his
receiver can catch it, and a willingness to throw the ball away when nothing is
there.
V. Harrington’s 2004
Performance Relative to the Strength of the Defense
All fans know that a
team’s offensive performance depends to a large extent on the quality of the
opposing defense. This is an important consideration when weighing the
incriminating numbers that depict Harrington’s swoon during the second half.
During the third, break out year in the West Coast offense, Harrington’s numbers
should be peeking rather than tanking. There might, however, be a more mundane
explanation for why Harrington’s numbers fell: by and large he faced tougher
defenses, especially against the pass. Also, quarterback ratings tend to edge
down when playing in outdoor stadiums during the onset of winter. Harrington’s
dismal numbers in the swirling winds of Lambeau serves as a case in point. The
table below accents Harrington’s performance relative to the rank of the defense
he was facing.
Table V. Harrington’s
Performance Relative to the Defense
|
Opponent |
Comp% |
Yards |
TD/INT |
Rating |
Defensive Rank/ |
|
I. @Chi |
53.8% |
187 |
1/1 |
73.7 |
22 |
|
II. Hou |
72% |
176 |
3/1 |
114.3 |
24 |
|
III. Phi |
55.3% |
199 |
2/0 |
87.5 |
10 |
|
IV. @ATL |
66.7% |
146 |
1/0 |
96.9 |
14 |
|
V. GB |
52.2% |
101 |
1/1 |
60.2 |
26 |
|
VI. @NY |
81.8% |
230 |
2/0 |
140.5 |
7 |
|
VII. @Dal |
59.4% |
255 |
2/1 |
92.6 |
17 |
|
VIII. Was |
50% |
269 |
1/1 |
63.7 |
3 |
|
IX. @Jac |
33.3% |
121 |
0/1 |
32.5 |
11 |
|
X. @Min |
63.2% |
91 |
1/1 |
70.3 |
29 |
|
XI. Ind |
60.9% |
156 |
0/0 |
81.1 |
31 |
|
XII. Ari |
55.6% |
196 |
1/1 |
75.5 |
12 |
|
XIII. @GB |
22.7% |
47 |
0/0 |
39.6 |
26 |
|
XIV. MN |
56.6% |
361 |
2/2 |
79.8 |
29 |
|
XV. Chi |
50.0% |
166 |
0/1 |
52.9 |
22 |
|
XVI. Ten |
67.3% |
346 |
2/1 |
92.7 |
28 |
There is no perfect
pattern here, but if you throw out the Green Bay games and the Giant’s game,
Harrington gets partial vindication. There is no question his second half
numbers are down, but their ebbs and flows generally reflect the quality of the
defense he was playing. The worse the defense was, especially the pass defense,
the better he tended to perform. The table makes me wonder about the Roy
Williams effect? Was a healthy Williams such a large factor that he single
handedly inflated Harrington’s QB rating by twenty points early in the season?
If his health was a significant part of that differential than the prospect of
having him back healthy and lining up next to Charles Rogers is very
encouraging.
VI. Maturing in the System
Perhaps the biggest part
of quarterback development is something which is difficult to measure through
statistics: game management. One could make a good argument that a
quarterback’s “development” cannot be accurately measured through team’s record
which is an outcome of the performance of different units.
Even the quarterback
rating reflects the performance of the eleven players in the offense. In the
extreme case where Harrington makes the right read and the right throw, but
Hakim runs a post rather than cutting for the out resulting in an interception,
the rating of performance and actual development stand in total contradiction.
Although there is no
number to measure game management, there are several statistics that we can mine
for signs of improvement. The thing that really stands out in Harrington’s 2004
season compared to earlier in his career is that he took a much higher number of
sacks.
The fact that his yards
per attempt average also increased dramatically suggests that Harrington was
taking more time and allowing routes to develop rather than checking down which
was a frequent occurrence last year. Also, the fact that Harrington threw
significantly fewer interceptions, signals that he had more patience or that he
was better at reading coverage. His rushing numbers also reveal remarkable
improvement. Although no one will mistake him for Michael Vick, Harrington ran
more often and for better yardage. He also converted more of these rushes into
first downs.
Table VI. Harrington’s
Rushing Numbers
|
Season |
Att |
Yards |
Avg |
Long |
Sacked/Yds |
|
2002 |
7 |
4 |
0.6 |
6 |
8/75 |
|
2003 |
30 |
86 |
2.9 |
26 |
9/55 |
|
2004 |
48 |
175 |
3.6 |
17 |
36/196 |
Having watched the games,
however, I think that these statistics fall short of capturing all of
Harrington’s “intangibles”, the nuances of game management that translates into
success and winning football. Harrington has generally not been very good at
throwing on the run, buying time when under pressure, or selling run fakes. His
poor performance in third down situations and his low yard per attempt average
are perhaps indications of this.
Harrington only
occasionally drew defenses off side, and there were rumors that he was tipping
plays. Mooch and Harrington had a season long feud when it came to the
execution of run/pass options, and even Harrington’s greatest admirers would
concede that he does not manage the game’s nuances akin to Peyton Manning. When
it comes to intangibles, my sense gleaned more from observation, but partially
supported by statistics is that Harrington did improve, but that there is still
significant room and need for progress in this department.
Table VII. Harrington’s
Game Management: Miscellaneous Statistics
|
Season |
20+ yd plays |
40+ yd plays |
Fumbles/Int |
Behind 1-8 pts |
|
2002 |
28 |
6 |
1/16 |
|
|
2003 |
24 |
3 |
0/22 |
|
|
2004 |
43 |
4 |
3/12 |
58.6 QB rating |
Generally Harrington has
improved at taking care of the ball and getting chunk plays in the passing game,
but this has by and large not come during critical situations. For instance,
when the Lions are behind by a touchdown or less, Harrington’s QB rating was a
dismal 58.6 (Favre is at 76.3 by comparison). When you think back on all the
games where the Lions were in the match during the fourth quarter and the
offense did nothing to win the game, it is hard not to jump to the conclusion
that Harrington played his poorest when it really mattered and if he had someone
found a way to make a play here or there, the story of the Lions’ season might
have been very different.
VII. The X-Factors
As I said earlier,
statistics measure outcomes and not the context that shaped them. For example a
five yard pass counts for a completion and five yards, whether a quarterback
completes an easy pass to a wide open running back in the flat against a prevent
defense or when he beats a blitz on a critical fourth down with a linebacker in
his face.
There are two very
important factors that influence a quarterback’s success, his protection and his
receivers. You can watch different NFL games and see that some quarterbacks
have more time than others. Some quarterbacks also have the benefit of great
playmakers. Donovan McNabb benefited from Terrell Owens. Culpepper’s stats
veered down when Randy Moss went out. How can such differences be statistically
represented?
Right now, there is no
official measure for these important variables. It would be interesting, for
instance, to have a statistic that records the average amount of time a
quarterback had before throwing a ball or getting sacked. Hurries and
knockdowns is not an official stat, but Harrington endured plenty of those,
especially from the porous left side of the line.
It would also be useful to
have a statistic for incompletions. Now, according to the NFL’s formula, they
get negatively attributed to the quarterback.
There are a number of
reasons why drops are not recorded as a statistic. One is that it is hard to
define exactly what a drop is. Was the ball catchable or not? And who was
responsible? Was the receiver running the route cleanly, did he make the right
read, or did the quarterback misplace it, or throw it at the wrong interval?
Normally on any given play it is matter of apportioning guilt between parties or
assigning credit to defensive players.
This complexity makes it
difficult if not impossible to represent drops in any objective way, although
NFL teams themselves do make the adjustment by factoring in inside information
and studying game film. Some amateur outlets do this calculation as well, but
their numbers are obviously less trustworthy. For your reading pleasure I
tabulated Harrington’s, Favre’s, and Manning’s incompletion numbers according to
Snap.stats.com.
Table VIII: Tripartite
Comparison of Incompletions
|
|
Harrington |
Favre |
Manning |
|
Dropped Pass |
36 |
26 |
17 |
|
Poor Throw |
85 |
82 |
77 |
|
Pass Defended |
41 |
40 |
34 |
|
Pass Hit at the Line |
15 |
10 |
6 |
|
Other |
26 |
19 |
17 |
|
Intercepted |
12 |
17 |
10 |
As a final thought on
X-factors, we all remember how Alexander “dropped” five passes in the end zone
and that Roy Williams dropped three. There were some other drops in the red
zone as well. Of course, not all those balls were as catchable as others, but
those I am thinking of specifically all resulted in Lions’ field goals. For
argument’s sake let’s say those eight balls had been caught for touchdowns. If
we were to recalculate Harrington’s QB rating it suddenly jumps to 86.4! That
would place Harrington 15th in the NFL a whisker behind Warner and an
inch above Jake Plummer. That is not Pro Bowl Territory to be sure, but it is
definitely more respectable than where Harrington hovers right now.
VIII. Conclusion
Having tried to break down
Harrington’s numbers exhaustively the word that springs to mind is
inconclusive. It is impossible to determine and hard to tell whether Harrington
will be the real deal someday or not. Of course, I knew this setting out on
this project. If statistics could predict the future we would not have stock
crashes, natural disasters, or busted draft picks.
Still, there was a method
to this madness. A careful scrutiny of statistics does lend deeper insight into
Harrington’s strengths and weaknesses. My findings might be inconclusive on the
big question of whether Joey is the real deal, but my investigation did come up
with a few startling findings that are worth bearing in mind when it comes to
deciding whether Harrington deserves another season.
Here is the equation as I
see it. In terms of performance, Joey’s numbers cannot help but to go up in
conjunction with improvements made in his surrounding cast. Injuries
forestalled that from happening this year. Even so, statistics suggest that Roy
Williams had the single largest impact on Harrington’s performance. If you
added him back into the line up healthy, with Charles Rogers and Kevin Jones-
that alone could pole-vault Harrington to above NFL average in terms of his
numbers. If the Lions also do something about their plague of drops and
Harrington continues to limit his mistakes, the playoffs start to look very
realistic next year.
The dark cloud in this
analysis is that it finds what Sherm Lewis reportedly suggested: Harrington’s
intangibles have not been great. He is at his worst when it matters most.
Unless he makes a significant improvement in this area, it seems unlikely that
the Lions will ever win a playoff game with him at the helm.
What is the nature of this
problem? Is it Harrington, the conservative offensive play calling, lack of
chemistry with receivers, or confidence? I would guess that it is all of these
factors and that if every one on the offensive side of the ball takes a few baby
steps forward, including, of course, Harrington, the Lions should improve their
performance during critical situations.
Based on Harrington’s
attitude and past performance you would expect him to work hard on improving his
ball fakes, the accuracy of his short throws, cadence, and running. There is
always the possibility that he will turn out to be a devout coward and that he
will always wilt under the blitz or pressure situations.
Despite the great unknown
lying before the Lions, at this point I can see no good argument for ditching
Joey Harrington. Critics cannot dispute that Harrington has developed, while
even “Joey lovers” must concede that his development needs to accelerate in a
hurry. This is perhaps the main reason why the debate about Harrington
continues to rage with so much passion. The numbers can support either camp.
It is necessary at this
point to acknowledge a great limitation embedded in the method of this study: I
have been examining Harrington’s development in vacuum, measuring his progress
according to his team and his past performance. To get a true measure of his
development we need to judge him according to an external standard. The best
measure of development comes from comparing Harrington’s performance and growth
curve to a wider sample of other NFL quarterbacks. To take up this challenge my
colleague, Mike Marino, will contribute the conclusion to this series.
